

ARXtools: A toolkit for ARX analysis

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Motivation

- ▶ Most of the cryptanalysis of ARX designs is **bit-twiddling**
 - ▶ As opposed to SBox based designs
- ▶ Building/Verifying differential path for ARX designs is **hard**
 - ▶ Many paths built by hand
 - ▶ Problems with MD5 and SHA-1 attacks [Manuel, DCC 2011]
 - ▶ Problems reported with boomerang attacks (incompatible paths):
 - ▶ HAVAL [Sasaki, SAC 2011]
 - ▶ SHA-256 [BLMN, Asiacrypt 2011]
- ▶ Some tools are described in literature, but most are not available

Our tools

- 1 Tool for S-systems
 - ▶ Similar to [Mouha & al., SAC 2010]
 - ▶ Completely automated
- 2 Representation of differential paths as sets of constraints, and analysis with S-systems
 - ▶ Similar to [De Cannière & Rechberger, Asiacrypt 2006]
 - ▶ New set of constraints
 - ▶ Propagation of *necessary* constraints
- 3 Graphical tool for bit-twiddling with differential paths

Outline

Introduction

S-system Analysis

Differential characteristics

Application

S-Systems

Definition

T-function $\forall t$, t bits of the output can be computed from t bits of the input.

S-function There exist a set of states \mathcal{S} so that:
 $\forall t$, bit t of the output and state $S[t] \in \mathcal{S}$ can be computed from bit t of the input, and state $S[t - 1]$.

S-system $f(P, x) = 0$
 f is an S-function, P is a parameter, x is an unknown

- ▶ Operations mod 2^n , Boolean functions are T-functions
- ▶ Addition, Xor, and Boolean operations are S-functions

Solving S-Systems

Important Example

$$x \oplus \Delta = x \boxplus \delta$$

- ▶ On average one solution
- ▶ **Easy** to solve because it's a T-function.
 - ▶ Guess LSB, check, and move to next bit
- ▶ How easy exactly?
- ▶ Backtracking is **exponential** in the worst case:

$$x \oplus 0x80000000 = x$$
- ▶ For random δ, Δ , most of the time the system is **inconsistent**

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Transition Automata

Carry transitions for $x \oplus \Delta = x \boxplus \delta$.

c	Δ	δ	x	c'
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	-
0	0	1	1	-
0	1	0	0	-
0	1	0	1	-
0	1	1	0	0
0	1	1	1	1

c	Δ	δ	x	c'
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1	1	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	0	-
1	1	1	1	-

We use **automata** to study S-systems:


[Mouha & al., SAC 2010]

- ▶ States represent the carries
- ▶ Transitions are labeled with the variables
- ▶ Automaton accepts solutions to the system.
- ▶ Can **count** the number of solutions.

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The edges are indexed by Δ, δ, x



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
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
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Decision Automata

Carry transitions for $x \oplus \Delta = x \boxplus \delta$.

The edges are indexed by Δ, δ, x




- ▶ Remove x from the transitions
- ▶ Can **decide** whether a given Δ, δ is compatible.
- ▶ Convert the non-deterministic automata to deterministic (optional).

Decision Automata

Decision automaton for $x \oplus \Delta = x \boxplus \delta$.

The edges are indexed by Δ, δ




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


- ▶ Remove x from the transitions
- ▶ Can **decide** whether a given Δ, δ is compatible.
- ▶ Convert the non-deterministic automata to deterministic (optional).

Our Tool

- Automatic construction of the automaton from a **natural expression**
Useful to study properties of the system

```
build_fsm -e "V0+P0 == V0^P1" -d -g | dot -Teps
```



- C functions to test **compatibility**, **count** solutions, or **solve** systems

Outline


Introduction

S-system Analysis

Differential characteristics

Application

Differential Characteristic




- ▶ Choose a **difference** operation: \oplus
- ▶ A **differential** only specifies the input and output difference
- ▶ A **difference characteristic** specifies the difference of each internal variable
 - ▶ Compute probability for each operation

$$c = a + b$$

$$u = c + d$$

$$v = u \lll 2$$

Differential Characteristic



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$$\begin{array}{l}
 c = a + b \\
 u = c + d \\
 v = u \lll 2
 \end{array}$$

Signed difference

- ▶ A path defines a set of **good pairs**:
 - ▶ $x^{[i]} \oplus x'^{[i]} = 1 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}) \in \{(0, 1), (1, 0)\}$
- ▶ Wang introduced a **signed difference**:
 - ▶ $\delta(x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}) = +1 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}) \in \{(0, 1)\}$
 - ▶ $\delta(x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}) = -1 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}) \in \{(1, 0)\}$
 - ▶ Captures both xor difference and modular difference
- ▶ Generalized constraints [De Cannière & Rechberger 06]
- ▶ **Problem**: how to compute probabilities?

Generalized constraints [De Cannière & Rechberger 06]

	(x, x') :	(0, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 0)	(1, 1)
?	<i>anything</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓
-	$x = x'$	✓	-	-	✓
x	$x \neq x'$	-	✓	✓	-
0	$x = x' = 0$	✓	-	-	-
u	$(x, x') = (0, 1)$	-	✓	-	-
n	$(x, x') = (1, 0)$	-	-	✓	-
1	$x = x' = 1$	-	-	-	✓
#	<i>incompatible</i>	-	-	-	-
3	$x = 0$	✓	✓	-	-
5	$x' = 0$	✓	-	✓	-
7		✓	✓	✓	-
A	$x' = 1$	-	✓	-	✓
B		✓	✓	-	✓
C	$x = 1$	-	-	✓	✓
D		✓	-	✓	✓
E		-	✓	✓	✓

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 - ▶ Captures both xor difference and modular difference
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- ▶ **Problem**: how to compute probabilities?

Generalized Characteristics

- ▶ We can write generalized constraints as an S-system:

$$P_0 = 0 \Rightarrow (x, x') \neq (0, 0) \qquad P_1 = 0 \Rightarrow (x, x') \neq (0, 1)$$

$$P_2 = 0 \Rightarrow (x, x') \neq (1, 0) \qquad P_3 = 0 \Rightarrow (x, x') \neq (1, 1)$$

- ▶ We can now **compute the probability** of a generalized characteristic.
 - ▶ Addition, Xor, Boolean functions are S-functions
 - ▶ Rotations just rotate the constraints

	(x, x') :	(0,0)	(0,1)	(1,0)	(1,1)	P_0	P_1	P_2	P_3
?	anything	✓	✓	✓	✓	1	1	1	1
-	$x = x'$	✓	-	-	✓	1	0	0	1
x	$x \neq x'$	-	✓	✓	-	0	1	1	0
0	$x = x' = 0$	✓	-	-	-	1	0	0	0
u	$(x, x') = (0, 1)$	-	✓	-	-	0	1	0	0
n	$(x, x') = (1, 0)$	-	-	✓	-	0	0	1	0
1	$x = x' = 0$	-	-	-	✓	0	0	0	1
#	incompatible	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0

New Constraints

- ▶ **Carry propagation** leads to constraints of the form $x^{[i]} = x^{[i-1]}$
- ▶ We use **new constraints** to capture this information
- ▶ We consider subsets of $\{(x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]}, x^{[i-1]})\}$ instead of $\{(x^{[i]}, x'^{[i]})\}$
- ▶ This can still be written as an S-system with Boolean filtering on $x, x', x \boxplus x$.

New Constraints Table

$(x \oplus x', x \oplus 2x, x)$: (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)									
?	anything	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
-	$x = x'$	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
x	$x \neq x'$	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓
0	$x = x' = 0$	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-	-
u	$(x, x') = (0, 1)$	-	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-
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1	$x = x' = 0$	-	✓	-	✓	-	-	-	-
#	incompatible	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
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A	$x' = 1$	-	✓	-	✓	✓	-	✓	-
=	$x = x' = 2x$	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
!	$x = x' \neq 2x$	-	-	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
>	$x \neq x' = 2x$	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	-
<	$x \neq x' \neq 2x$	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓

Propagation of constraints

We use S-systems to **propagate** constraints:

- 1 Split subsets in two smaller subsets
- 2 If one subset gives zero solutions, the characteristic can be restricted to the other subset.

$$? \rightarrow -/x, 3/C, 5/A$$

$$- \rightarrow 0/1, =/!$$

$$x \rightarrow u/n, >/<$$

$$3 \rightarrow 0/u$$

$$C \rightarrow 1/n$$

$$5 \rightarrow 0/n$$

$$A \rightarrow 1/u$$

$$= \rightarrow 0/1$$

$$! \rightarrow 0/1$$

$$> \rightarrow u/n$$

$$< \rightarrow u/n$$

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Verifying paths

Problem

Most analysis assume that operations are **independent** and multiply the probabilities.

But sometimes, operations are not independent...

Known problem in Boomerang attacks.


[Murphy, TIT 2011]

- ▶ We compute **necessary** conditions.
- ▶ This allows to detect cases of **incompatibility**
- ▶ We have detected problems in several published works
 - ▶ Incompatible paths seem to appear quite naturally

Boomerang incompatibility

$\delta a = -x-$ $\delta b = ---$ Top path: $(a^{(0)}, b^{(0)}; a^{(2)}, b^{(2)}) (a^{(1)}, b^{(1)}; a^{(3)}, b^{(3)})$

$\delta a = -x-$ $\delta b = -x-$ Bottom path: $(a^{(0)}, b^{(0)}; a^{(1)}, b^{(1)}) (a^{(2)}, b^{(2)}; a^{(3)}, b^{(3)})$



 $\delta u = ---$

$$u = a + b$$

	$x^{(0)}$	$x^{(1)}$	$x^{(2)}$	$x^{(3)}$
a	0	1	1	0
b	1	0	0	1


- ▶ Appears easily with linearized paths, e.g. Blake [Biryukov & al., FSE 2011]

- ▶ Wlog, assume $a^{(0)} = 0$
- ▶ Compute $a^{(i)}$, deduce $b^{(i)}$
- ▶ Contradiction for $b!$

Boomerang incompatibility

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \delta a = -x- & \delta b = --- & \text{Top path: } (a^{(0)}, b^{(0)}; a^{(2)}, b^{(2)}) (a^{(1)}, b^{(1)}; a^{(3)}, b^{(3)}) \end{array}$$

$$\delta a = -x- \quad \delta b = -x- \quad \text{Bottom path: } (a^{(0)}, b^{(0)}; a^{(1)}, b^{(1)}) (a^{(2)}, b^{(2)}; a^{(3)}, b^{(3)})$$



$$\delta u = ---$$

$$u = a + b$$


	$x^{(0)}$	$x^{(1)}$	$x^{(2)}$	$x^{(3)}$
a	0	1	1	0
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- ▶ Appears easily with linearized paths, e.g. Blake [Biryukov & al., FSE 2011]

- ▶ Wlog, assume $a^{(0)} = 0$
- ▶ Compute $a^{(i)}$, deduce sign of b
- ▶ Contradiction for $b!$


Incompatibility with additions

Some “natural” differentials do not work with additions:



$$u = a + b + c$$


- ▶ Linearized path



$$u = a + b$$


- ▶ Seems valid with signed difference
- ▶ Found in Skein near-collision
[eprint 2011/148]

Carry incompatibility




- ▶ Each operation has a non-zero probability
- ▶ Path seems valid with signed difference
- ▶ Consider the 1st addition
 - ▶ Constraint: $c^{[4]} \neq c^{[5]}$
- ▶ Consider the 2nd addition
 - ▶ Constraint: $c'^{[2]} = c'^{[3]}$
- ▶ **Incompatible!**
 - ▶ Detected with the new constraints

Carry incompatibility




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


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Graphical tool

- ▶ To study more complex cases, we have a graphical tool
- ▶ We can manually constrain some bits and propagate.
- ▶ Problems found in the Boomerang paths for Skein-512

[Chen & Jia, ISPEC 2010]



Main result

Many published attacks are **invalid**.

- ▶ Boomerang attacks on Blake [Biryukov & al., FSE 2011]
 - ▶ **Basic linearized paths**, with MSB difference
 - ▶ Proposed attack on 7/8 round for KP and 6/6.5 for CF do not work
 - ▶ 7-round KP attack can be made with the 6-round path
 - ▶ 8-round KP attack and 6/6.5-round CF attack can be fixed using another active bit (non-MSB)

- ▶ Boomerang attacks on Skein-512 [Chen & Jia, ISPEC 2010]
 - ▶ **Basic linearized paths**, with MSB difference
 - ▶ Proposed attacks do not work on Skein-512
 - ▶ Similar paths work on Skein-256 [Leurent & Roy, CT-RSA 2012]
 - ▶ Can be fixed using another active bit?

- ▶ Near-collision attack on Skein [eprint 2011/148]
 - ▶ **Complex rebound-like** handcrafted path
 - ▶ Path is not satisfiable

Conclusion

We hope these tools will be useful to cryptanalists...

Code and documentation available at:

<http://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/arxtools.html>